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Loyalists have been curiously handled by historians. Traditionally 
ignored by British scholars, snubbed or misunderstood by Americans, they 
have been the object so often of much misguided devotion by Canadians. 1 
Recently, they have begun to emerge both from oblivion in America and 
the hands of the mythmakers in Canada. Among the most recent valuable 
studies must be counted Nelson's work on their ideology, The American 
Tory (1962), Smith's investigation of their military role, Loyalists and Red-
coats (1964), and Brown's analysis of their socio-economic status, The King's 
Friends. Composition and Motives of the American Loyalist Claimants 
(1965) and his The Good Americans (1969). To this select list must now 
be added Dr. Norton's examination of the loyalist exiles in England. 2 Such 
scholarship, no longer isolated, holds the realistic hope that the loyalist 
phenomenon will become a matter of growing scholarly concern. 
Dr. Norton's work, a revision of her 1969 Harvard dissertation, focuses 
on the seven or eight thousand people who fled to England from 177 4 to 
1784. They formed about ten percent of those who abandoned their homes 
in the Thirteen Colonies. Her raw material is found principally in Audit 
Office papers (A.O. 12 and A.O. 13) at the Public Record Office, but now 
available at a number of archives in Canada and the United States, and yet 
ignored by scholars until Brown demonstrated their enormous value. The 
usefulness of this source and others are described in an excellent bibliograph-
ical essay (pp. 260-72). 
The author believes that most loyalists originated where the serious 
fighting occurred. This view is in marked contrast to the earlier notion that 
the number of exiles in a particular region was directly proportional to the 
strength of loyalism in that locality. Brown had earlier concluded that 
loyalism was a "distinctly urban and seaboard phenomenon," with major 
rural inland pockets only in New York and North Carolina. Dr. Norton 
believes that only the presence of the British army gave Americans adequate 
incentive to declare their loyalty to the crown. The principal exodus of 
loyalists from Massachusetts, as an example, took place in 1775 and 1776, 
before the British garrison at Boston withdrew. There were more exiles in 
England from Massachusetts than from any other colony, yet it was 
generally thought the province was the "most disaffected" of any in America. 
By contrast, few fled England from New York, which had strong loyalist 
1 For a bibliographical survey see Wallace BROWN, "The View at Two Hundred 
Years: The Loyalists of the American Revolution," American Antiquarian Society 
Proceedings, LXXX (April 1970), 25-47. 
2 An introductory survey of the question was presented by Wallace BROWN, 
"American Loyalists in Britain," History Today, XIX (October 1969), 672-78. A few 
prominent refugees were earlier considered by Lewis EISTETIN, Divided Loyalties. 
Americans in England during the War of Independence (Boston: 1933). 
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feelings, until after the defeat at Yorktown, a fact explained only by the 
presence of a strong British garrison on Long Island and Manhattan Island. 
Dr. Norton shows that exile did not tend to break down social barriers 
between loyalists. She found "little sense of community among refugees" 
(p. 78). Initially they thought of their dislocation as temporary; the news 
of the setback at Saratoga (1778) obliged them to begin to make rather 
more permanent plans. Hitherto they had congregated largely in London; 
thereafter an exodus began to the provinces, especially to Bristol, Glasgow 
(Virginians), and Chester (New York). Presumably it was Glasgow's domina-
tion of the Virginia tobacco trade which drew the colonists from the 
Chesapeake northwards, but Dr. Norton does not comment on this. 
Wherever the exiles went in Britain, they found not a home as they 
had hoped but largely an alien culture and a government uninterested in 
their advice and initially unmindful of their plight. As Dr. Norton puts it, 
"the loyalists realized how American they were only after they had aban-
doned America" (p. 41). Their isolation was later given further emphasis 
as their knowledge of America became dated and distorted, the fate of any 
exile, it would seem ! Brown had earlier found that the government was 
in general "woefully negligent in rallying and making use of the loyalists," 
while loyalist strength "would have been considerably greater had the British 
government and army shown more interest and finesse toward their real 
or potential allies, or at least avoided harassing them." Dr. Norton now 
has added to this picture by showing how little heed at first was paid the 
advice on American affairs given by loyalists to the government of Lord 
North. Before the Declaration of Independence those who had fled America 
for England wholly failed to make any impression upon British policy. 
They were rarely consulted; and when, as in the case of Thomas Hutchinson, 
the former governor of Massachusetts, they were frequently asked their 
opinion, their views were ignored. Only after the defeat at Saratoga did 
loyalist suggestions begin to coincide with British policy. Their view was 
that the overwhelming body of Americans preferred union with Britain to 
independence; the war therefore should be carried on chiefly in those parts 
supposedly more loyal than "the reportedly more disaffected northern 
colonies" (p. 167). Dr. Norton believes that the only time the loyalist lobby 
succeeded it helped solidify the government in its own mistaken direction 
of the war: the launching of the southern campaign which led to Yorktown. 
The evidence she advances, however, is not conclusive. 
Dr. Norton has taken great pains to identify as many as possible of 
the exiles. They were a mixed lot: colonial officials, lawyers, clerics, doctors, 
large and small merchants and shopkeepers, absentee landowners and small 
farmers, artisans and poor urban labourers. Unfortunately she attempts no 
analysis of the proportions between one group and another, nor of the 
relative group size of the claims for compensation which they eventually 
submitted to the government. Such information would enable us to estimate 
their relative wealth and their general ability to secure credit and so become 
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re-established in exile. Brown had earlier shown that, though loyalists 
counted many poor people among their numbers, many southerners and 
New Englanders were well-to-do. Probably an inordinately large proportion 
of these made their way to England, where London-based loyalists formed 
the majority of claimants, though they formed less than one-tenth of all exiles. 
Since forty-five percent of the 2,908 cases studied by Brown asked for 
compensation of £1,000 or more (and of these one-third claimed £5,000 
or more), it would seem that Dr. Norton's exiles were predominately from 
an economic elite. This would perhaps help to explain their vociferousness 
in seeking compensation from Britain. The poor, with much smaller losses, 
made less trouble for the government. 
Despite the relative wealth of the English exiles, few had sufficient 
capital or credit to survive indefinitely, especially in a period of wartime 
inflation, an important point, which neither Norton nor Brown mentiOns. 
Professional men usually lacked appropriate training for England, and so 
could not immediately be employed. Officials could not be easily re-employed, 
as few colonial positions came open. In this connection, Dr. Norton suggests 
rather rashly that the establishment of separate governments for New 
Brunswick and Cape Breton in 1784 was largely a scheme to create colonial 
posts for unemployed loyalists (p. 240). Clerics, if they were lucky, were 
offered rather mean, rural livings or were granted pensions by the Society 
for the Propagation of the Gospel. 
The government, or rather the British taxpayer, ultimately came to the 
aid of all; but before the policy was enunciated financial anxiety was the 
lot of most families. Although Dr. Norton's figures are not clear, it would 
seem that by the end of hostilities almost £157,000 had been granted in 
pensions to exiled loyalists. This relative parsimony on the part of the 
government occasioned general resentment. Widespread lobbying of the 
government began among the loyalists in earnest only when the terms of the 
peace treaty were known. Despite the beliefs of both the American and 
British peace negotiators that the treaty would be adhered to, the loyalists 
believed, quite correctly as it turned out, that the rebels would ignore 
Article V, by which Congress was to recommend to the states the restoration 
of all property of persons who had not borne arms for the king, and grant 
to others a year in which to attempt to recover their property. The govern-
ment for its part thought otherwise. As Dr. Norton explains, "In order to 
cut its losses and escape from the war as quickly as possible, the Shelburne 
administration elected to shoulder the responsibility for compensating what 
it thought would be a few loyalists too obnoxious to receive consideration 
from the Americans. But the treaty it accepted on those grounds not only 
brought down the government but also involved Great Britain in the affairs 
of the loyalists for years to come. For, because of American hostility towards 
the loyalists, what the ministry had originally envisioned as a brief enquiry 
into a limited number of claims from refugees not compensated by the United 
States turned into a comprehensive, detailed, and exceptionally complex 
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investigation into the cases of more than three thousand loyalist exiles" 
(p. 184). 
Faced with the failure of Article V, the loyalists, hitherto isolated 
individuals and insular small groupings, banded together to lobby for com-
pensation from Britain. Their efforts were very successful. Though "blatant 
falsification was rare" (p. 205), the claims were invariably extravagant. 
Especially inflated were estimates of land values, which, for various reasons, 
not considered by Dr. Norton, fell in the 1780's from their pre-war heights. 
By the 1790's many of the exaggerations of the decade before had been 
transformed into serious under-assessments, as land prices recovered and at-
tained unprecedented levels. In the end 2,291 claimants received £3,033,091 
or about thirty-seven percent of their estimated losses of £8.2 millions. 
It was ·generally found easier to estimate the value of land than of 
chattels or merchants' stock. Since the claims commissioners usually accepted 
the lowest estimates, Dr. Norton believes that "small landowners, if their 
land was cultivated, received a higher percentage return on their claim than 
did artisans, tradesmen, and professional men, the bulk of whose property 
consisted of furniture, houses, books, tools and the like" (p. 219). Some of 
the professionals were additionally compensated with pensions, but merchants 
apparently fared the least well among claimants. 
So much attention has focused on the work of the claims commission, 
that it usually forgotten that other forms of financial support for the exiles 
was forthcoming. At the beginning of 1786, 840 refugees were still receiving 
pensions amounting annually to £57,528. Most of these were poor, and as 
they had held no property in America, they had laid no claim for compensa-
tion. Furthermore, a large number of loyalist officers were granted half-pay, 
which had not been originally envisaged when they had been given commis-
sions. In addition many with no right to half-pay actually received military 
pensions: "The exiles quickly learned that it was possible for men with only 
minimal military pretentions to qualify for allowances, and they soon came 
to regard the half-pay system as nothing more than another kind of com-
pensation for their sufferings and losses in America" (p. 232). For a govern-
ment struggling with "Economical Reform" in an attempt to decrease the 
National Debt in the years after 1783, this was remarkably generous. 
The book, in conclusion, ought to be of great interest both to social 
and political historians of the eighteenth century. It doubtless will give rise 
to further, more particular study of loyalists who settled permanently in 
Ireland and Scotland, as well as in England. It should also prove of 
permanent value to historians of New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and Cape 
Breton, where so many of the English exiles ultimately settled. 
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